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Abstract
Ethnicity is emerging as a focal consideration in the politics of identity in contemporary Assam, a state 
of the Indian union in the North East of India. Often identiﬁ ed as a ﬂ ash point in the subversive poli-
tics that question the logistics of the Indian nation, North East India is emerging as a cartographic 
domain that posits questions of internal colonialism and hegemony. Cartographic reorientation of ter-
ritory based on factors of linguistic and ethnic identity is perceived as a way to acquire new homelands 
that will foster self-validation and the ‘all round development’ of the people. The North East of India is 
dotted with armed insurrection for autonomous territories under the Indian Union or total severance, 
depending on the population and the spatial domain of the ethnic groups in question. The linkages with 
questions of social, cultural and political marginalisation, as well as political assertion provide interest-
ing scope for academic exploration. The present paper seeks to understand and trace such assertive 
movements in Assam to forces of historical neglect as well as the rhetoric of marginalisation that is 
surfeit in contemporary assertive idioms of diﬀ erent ethnic groups.
Keywords: identity, ethnicity, transactive domain, resistant pluralism, cartography.
Introduction
Assam is a state of the Indian Union, located in what is known as the North East of India comprising 
eight states1 of the Indian Union. It shares international borders with China, Myanmar (Burma), 
Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal. The British annexation of Assam into Colonial India began in 1824 as a 
response to the Burmese invasion of Assam in 1822 and was complete by 1839. The Colonial province 
of Assam, by 1874, was a large administrative area with the annexation of Naga Hills in 1826, Jaintia, 
Garo and Khasi Hills by 1835 and the Lushai Hills in 1895 into British India. The North East, by the 
time of India’s independence in 1947, comprised of the states of Assam, Manipur, Tripura and the 
predominantly Buddhist frontier province of North East Frontier Agency (NEFA), which became a full 
ﬂ edged state of the Indian Union in 1986, and was renamed as Arunachal Pradesh.
In the aftermath of Indian independence, diﬀ erent ethnic groups within the administrative 
domain of Assam began voicing their aspirations for self-determination that ranged from demands 
of autonomy within the Indian union to complete secession. The Naga Hills district of Assam was 
separated from Assam and became a full ﬂ edged state within the Indian union in 1963; however, 
attempts at secession from India continue and the Government of India is in negotiation with some 
of the secessionists groups, and a partial cease ﬁ re is in place. There are occasional bloody upsurges 
of interethnic clashes between the diﬀ erent ethnic groups ﬁ ghting for secession and a negotiated 
settlement still looks remote. The Lushai Hill district, after a bloody and protracted struggle for 
1 The eight states are Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim and Tripura.
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secession, was separated from Assam as a centrally administered territory2 in 1972, and a full ﬂ edged 
state named Mizoram within the Indian union in 1987. Unlike Nagaland, statehood ushered in peace 
and stability, and Mizoram is held up as a success story of the Indian Government’s policy of negotiated 
settlement.
The United Khasi and Jaintia Hills district and Garo Hills district of Assam, in response to growing 
demand for autonomy by the ‘tribal’ areas of the state, was cohered into a semiautonomous region 
of Meghalaya within the state of Assam in 1970 before becoming a full ﬂ edged state within the Indian 
union in 1972. Thus, by 1972 Assam was divided into four states: the Hindu majority Assam with 
a sizeable Muslim population, and the Christian hill states of Nagaland, Mizoram and Meghalaya. 
However, in the 1960’s, there was a movement in the predominantly Bengali speaking Southern 
Assam, popularly known as Barak Valley, after the river Barak which ﬂ ows through the region, against 
the Government of Assam’s notiﬁ cation declaring Assamese as the oﬃ  cial state language. On the 
19th of May, 1961, 11 people lost their lives in a police shooting in Silchar, the headquarters of the 
southern Assam district of the then undivided Cachar, while agitating for the recognition of Bengali 
as an oﬃ  cial language. The government of Assam subsequently gave the status of oﬃ  cial language 
to Bengali in Southern Assam that now comprises of the three district of Cachar, Karimganj and 
Hailakandi. However, the language issue keeps cropping up sporadically, the latest being in 1980 when 
Assamese was made a compulsory subject in the secondary school of Assam, only to be subsequently 
rescinded.
However, the creation of Meghalaya can be said to mark the ﬁ rst phase of the complete fracturing 
of Colonial Assam, and a relative lull was observed in territorial demands based on tribal/ ethnic/ 
linguistic identity till the 1980’s. In 1979, the inﬂ uential All Assam Students Union (AASU) and All 
2 In India, centrally administered territories are known as Union Territories, and are under the direct control of 
the central government at New Delhi.
Figure 1: Assam at the time of independence showing the then neigbouring states of Tripura and 
Manipur
Source: www.sikhphilosophy.net/sikhheritage/28839-assamese-sikhs.html (accessed 23.09.2011)
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Assam Gana Sangram Parishad3 (AAGSP) launched the anti-foreigners agitation against Bangladeshi 
immigrants, and it enjoyed unprecedented mass support in the hill districts and Brahmaputra valley, 
as all the constituent ethnic groups that went into the evolution and consolidation of the Assamese 
nation lent its might to the movement, popularly known as the Assam Agitation or Assam Movement 
that had as its agenda the identiﬁ cation and deportation of Bangladeshi nationals and the prevention 
of fresh inﬁ ltration. It was during the movement that the secessionist United Liberation Front of 
Assam (ULFA)4 was formed and a violent insurrection for an independent Assam was launched. The 
Assam accord was signed in 1985 with the Government of India, and the AASU and AAGSP agreed to 
end the movement. The political party Asom Gana Parishad5 came into being and it rode to power in 
1985, steered by the leaders of the Assam Movement. Meanwhile, the ULFA gradually strengthened, 
and the armed and violent battle of attrition continues.
Not all the contributing constituents of the Assam movement were happy with the aftermath of 
the Assam accord, and many found themselves out of the corridors of power. Upendranath Brahma, 
who was a close collaborator of AASU, launched the All Bodo Students Union’s (ABSU) movement 
for the self-determination of the Bodos, the largest ethnic group in Assam, with the collaboration of 
Bodo People’s Action Committee (BPAC), formed on the lines of AAGSP in 1987. The principal demand 
was for a separate Bodoland state. Parallel to the ABSU’s movement, groups like Bodoland Liberation 
Tigers (BLT) and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) were formed, whose agenda was 
a violent and armed rebellion for the self-determination and freedom of the Bodo people. In 1995, 
3 Gana Sangram Parishad in Assamese would translate to ‘Organisation of People’s Struggle’
4 United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) was formed on April 7, 1979 by a group of radical activists of the anti-
foreigners movement to free Assam from the colonial Indian Government. This was the beginning of a long 
battle of attrition in Assam, and marked a turning point in the history of insurgency in the region as Assam was 
added to list of states traditionally riddled with anti Indian armed struggles, namely Manipur and Nagaland.
5 Asom Gana Parishad in Assamese translates into the ‘The 0rganisation of the people of Assam’
Figure 2: Map of Assam showing diﬀ erent districts
Source: www.123yatra.com/india/eastern-india/assam (accessed 23.09.2011)
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the Indian Government conceded the autonomous Bodoland Territorial Council to the Bodo people, 
but the movement for statehood still continues, in the trajectories of the upgradation of Meghalaya 
from an autonomous region to statehood, with one faction of the NDFB in a truce and the other in 
rebellion. Similar statehood demands dot Assam, with the hill districts of Karbi Anglong demanding a 
Karbi State for the Karbi ethnic group and the hill district of North Cachar Hills demanding a Dimasa 
state for the Dimasa ethnic group by integrating all Dimasa speaking regions of the North East that 
includes tracts in Nagaland and Southern Assam. Both demands are backed by armed rebel groups, 
factions of which are now in negotiations, while others carry on with their insurrection. The recent 
renaming of the district of North Cachar Hills to Dima Hasao (land of the Dimasas) invited strong 
protests from other ethnic groups like the Hmars and Jeme Nagas, as they contend the assertion that 
North Cachar Hills is a Dimasa homeland.
The politics of identity: language, culture and homeland
Thus, it can be understood from the short introductory note above that identity formation dominates 
the contemporary political and social discourse in the North East of India. Ethnic assertion, revivalism, 
and quests for a separate space are the major trajectories around which such identity struggles 
revolve. Most resistant and resurgent idioms are centered on the issue of language, which is linked 
up with ethnic identity. This can be linked to the reorganisation of states on the basis of language in 
India after independence. States were carved out around the identity of major Indian languages. Most 
Indian states were identiﬁ ed with a language.6 Thus, it was widely assumed that Assam was a land 
for the Assamese speaking people. But it created its own problems. Assam was a multiethnic state, 
where diﬀ erent ethnic groups had their own languages, and the viewing of Assam being a land for the 
Assamese was seen as a dominance of the oﬃ  cial and majority language over other languages spoken 
by numerically smaller groups. This doubled as an indicator of the Assamese dominance over other 
ethnic groups. Thus, present articulations for separate homelands based on language as an identity 
marker in Assam are informed by social, political and historical conﬂ ict, and “the complex relations 
6 Thus, West Bengal is the homeland for the Bengalis, Maharastra for the Marathis, Tamil Nadu for the Tamils, 
Kerala for the Malayalees and so on.
Figure 3: The map of the Bodo Territorial Autonomous Districts (BTAD) carved out within the state of 
Assam
Source: www.bodoland.in (accessed on 23.09.2011)
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between /. . ./ language and political history embodies the conﬂ ict of social forces which will produce 
particular discursive forms, eﬀ ects and representations” (Crowley 1993: 70). Speakers of the Assamese 
language at various moments in history strived for cultural uniﬁ cation and nationalistic consolidation 
through the appropriation of their ethnic hinterland that were dotted by many other languages. This 
was mainly attempted by making Assamese the medium of instructions in educational institutions 
like schools and colleges. In hindsight, this is seen as an imposition on and scuttling of the potential 
of smaller nationalities, for whom identities were intricately linked up with their languages. 
However, such attempts at linguistic and, thereby, cultural appropriation did not always mean the 
exclusion of diversity and apparently hegemonistic and nationalistic discourses, like the champions of 
Assamese nationalism, who often responded to demands for linguistic and political representations 
by accommodating such demands. This is most evident in both political domains and expressive 
domains like music and literature.
In the expressive domain, one would like to mention the genres of Assamese ﬁ ction as a form that 
constantly strived to meet the historical requirements of a unifying discourse by accommodating and 
glorifying cultural subtexts in an attempt to forge a greater Assamese cultural text. The ﬁ rst conscious 
attempt to narrate the plural nature of the region and portray the diverse ethnic composition was 
made in Assamese literature, especially in ﬁ ction. The earliest novel of prominence in this genre 
is Rajani Kanta Bordoloi’s Miri Jiyori [Daughter of the Miris] (1894), which tries to represent one of 
the prominent ethnic communities in the Northeast, the Misings, earlier called the Miris, through 
the narration of a tragic love story. After Independence, Kailash Sarma’s Bidrohi Nagar Hatot [In the 
Clutches of the Rebel Nagas] (1958), Anami Nagini [Naga With No Name] (1963) and Dalimir Sapon [Dalimi’s 
Dream] (1972) depicted the Naga way of life and gave the ﬁ rst hint of narrating ethnic assertions 
and the violence associated with it. Early post-independent Assamese literature perceived itself as an 
integral part of the imperative to narrate the nation and integrate plural entities into the national 
consciousness. A kind of inclination towards metanarratives was emerging in India in the ﬁ rst ﬂ ush 
of Independence, and the conscious attempt was to consolidate a larger Indian identity by the 
processes of homogenising. Early post-independent Assamese authors inhabited these socio-political 
narratives, and one should view early writings keeping this nationalistic appropriative discourse in 
mind. Jnanpeeth award winning novel Mritunjoy [Triumph Beyond Death] (1970) by Birendra Kumar 
Bhattacharya and Umakanta Sarma’s Ejak Manuh Ekhan Aranya [The Crowd and the Forest] (1986) are 
novels that immediately come to mind. Both the novels have the representation of ethnicity, but the 
main aim was to forge and consolidate regional and, thereby, national identity. The ﬁ rst novel has 
the revolutionary approach to the Independence struggle as its main preoccupation, where ethnic 
representations are incidental to the main narrative thrust, and how such struggle forms a common 
legacy that binds the nation together. The second novel is a humanistic depiction of the travails of 
the immigration of the labourers of the tea industry into Assam, their emergence as a distinct ethnic 
identity, and the author’s ideal of their ﬁ nal assimilation and integration into the canvas of a larger 
Assamese society. In the realm of popular culture, over the years Assamese music and ﬁ lm have tried 
to accommodate and glorify the ethnic subtexts of the greater Assamese nationalistic text.
In the political front, throughout its post-independent history the Government of Assam has set 
up autonomous councils for diﬀ erent ethnic groups, and Assam has two district councils for the hill 
districts of Karbi Anglong and Dima Hasao, an autonomous council for the Bodo Territorial Council, 
and six more autonomous councils for six diﬀ erent ethnic communities: the Tiwas, Rabhas, Misings, 
Sonowal-Kacharis, Thengal-Kacharis and the Deuris. In addition to these, the government of Assam has 
announced the setting up of autonomous councils for seven more ethnic groups in 2010, namely the 
Ahoms, Mataks, Morans, Koch-Rajbangshis, Chutiyas, Adivasis and Gorkhas. Thus, in the constitution 
of the essential ethnic self, the determining markers are notions of a ‘homeland’ and the ‘mother 
tongue’. Homelands are often sought to be concretised in terms of cartographic representation, the 
determining markers being language, art and culture; hence, the rush for new maps is seen as a 
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promised deliverance from dystopias, the horror of an exploitative and uncompromising state and 
socio-economic structure, the corrupt others. Creating new homelands through maps is basically an 
attempt to sanctify spaces from corrupt cultural and political intrusions, loss of livelihood options, 
and expunge the cultural others.
It is with an awareness of the uniqueness of the situation in Assam that one has to enter into the 
emerging theoretical premises of Northeast studies in India. The need is to historicise theoretical 
debates in their socio-political context. However, one would also need a certain amount of sympathetic 
intellect to humanise such debates. The earlier centripetal trends of uniﬁ cation and nationalistic 
consolidation can be seen as a response to the need of consolidating new found nationhood as the:
/…/ fate of nations which have managed to escape from colonial rule and the historical complexities 
involved in such processes serve as further counter-examples … The preference for pluralism and diﬀ erence 
may well be laudable one but history demonstrates that forms of unity and organization may be a 
prerequisite before such an achievement can be attained. (Crowley 1993: 85)
The present centrifugal trends that celebrate diﬀ erences and ethnic uniqueness in Assam are the 
symptoms of a radical rearrangement and realigning of political and cultural dynamics. As Gramsci 
had mentioned, “every time the question of language surfaces, in one way or another, it means that a 
series of other problems are coming to the fore: the formation and enlargement of the governing class, 
the need to establish more intimate relationship between the governing groups and the national-
popular mass, in other words to reorganize cultural hegemony” (in ibid: 83).
Interethnic dialogues and pluralism
Assam is marked by the existence of numerous languages and dialects that is held up as a dominant 
marker of a plural society. However, the mere façade of a plural society does not always indicate the 
existence of a mutual and dialogic engagement between cultures. Contemporary debates on pluralism 
owe its antecedents to the observations of Furnivall, who had marked a plural society to be a ‘medley 
of peoples’ that ‘mix but do not combine’:
Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals 
they meet, but only in the market-place, in buying and selling. There is plural society, with diﬀ erent sections 
of the community living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit. (Watson 2002:19)
Furnivall’s observation is important because it was based on the observation of an emerging 
multiethnic Asian milieu in South East Asia, traits similar to the social, cultural and political set up 
in Assam and North East India. Furnivall’s ‘market place’ can be said to be the part of a transactive 
domain, where the constituents of a plural society engage and deal with each other. According to 
Azyumardi Azra, an Indonesian scholar:
Furnivall further maintained that this situation is accompanied by a caste-like division of labor, in 
which ethno-religious groups play diﬀ erent economic roles. This social segregation, in turn, gives rise to 
what Furnivall regarded as these societies’ most unsettling political trait: their lack of common social 
will. Facing this unfortunate situation, Furnivall asserted that unless some kind of formula for pluralist 
federation could be devised … pluralism seemed doomed to a nightmarish anarchy. Furnivall’s ‘doomed’ 
scenario by and large fortunately failed to materialize itself. In contrast, a post-war Southeast Asia saw the 
establishment of independent Indonesia and other countries. But, this national independence was assumed 
to paradoxically stimulate the rise of ethno-religious sentiment in the struggle for control and power of the 
new state. Indonesia saw outbreaks of communal violence in the late 1950s and 1965; more shocking yet, 
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Indonesia was shaken by bitter, though intermittent, ethno-religious violence since 1996—the ﬁ nal years of 
President Soeharto in power—up to 2005, when all communal conﬂ icts from Ambon (Maluku province) to 
Poso (Central Sulawesi province) and Aceh were ﬁ nally peacefully resolved. (Azra 2010)
Daniel P. S. Goh, a scholar from Singapore, distinguishes post-imperial societies and postcolonial 
societies, while directing attention to the nature of plural societies in South East Asia. Post imperial 
societies are ‘former metropolitan and dominion societies of the First World’, whereas postcolonial 
societies consist of the nonwhite societies of ‘Third World’ Asia and Africa. He goes on to argue:
/…/ the problem of multiculturalism in the latter category goes deeper than the political eﬀ ects of 
colonial racialization in structuring citizenship and national identity issues. The key diﬀ erence between 
postimperial and postcolonial societies is the nature of the state. The state in postimperial societies is 
liberal democratic, with a long history of being conditioned by civil society struggles against state power, 
or the cultivation of civil society institutions and representative democracy as in the case of the former 
dominions. But the state in postcolonial societies is born of the colonial imposition of absolute power and 
built on colonial racialization as opposed to being merely inﬂ ected by it as in postimperial societies. As an 
instrument of absolute rule, sometimes intentionally operating with a divide-and-rule strategy but mostly 
operating on the premise of ethnic pluralism along the lines prescribed by colonial racialization, the colonial 
state intervened into local society and organized the social economy according to its pluralist model. 
Consequently, the nationalist elites who inherited the legacies of colonialism also inherited a racial state 
and its pluralist worldview. Resulting separatist ethnonationalisms and ethnic conﬂ ict are symptoms of 
the continued operation of the racial state, and ironically, symptoms that conﬁ rmed its pluralist model. In 
such a situation where the political eﬀ ects of colonial racialization are acute and traverse the entire length 
and breadth of state–society relationship, the problem of multiculturalism revolves around the question of 
whether the ruling group could establish itself as the transcultural elite who can legitimately deﬁ ne the 
distribution of the economic spoils of national development to ethnic groups. (Goh 2008: 233-234)
In a similar observation on the North East of India, Patricia Mukhim, an activist journalist from 
Meghalaya, opines that:
The modern Indian view is /…/ that the existence of diﬀ erent ethnic identities within the nation and the 
existence of systems to separate these identities are divisions which in themselves are a source of conﬂ ict 
and therefore ethno cultural assimilation is both desirable and inevitable. But in fact, the exact opposite 
is true. The point about ethno culturally divided societies is that they wish to remain divided. A Bengali or 
a Bihari is determined to retain and preserve his identity as is a Khasi. Each group draws the essence of its 
being, its group consciousness from the fact that it is diﬀ erent, and that it wishes to remain diﬀ erent. Those 
who see division as a source of conﬂ ict overlook the fact that conﬂ ict arises because threats to the factors 
which make for that division – threats to separate identity, characteristics, or even real or perceived threats 
to the existence of the group. (Mukhim 1996: 30-31)
Siddhartha Deb, a Bengali from Assam settled in the United States who writes ﬁ ction in English, 
deals with the plight of the Bengali Hindu settlers in the North East from erstwhile East Pakistan, 
now Bangladesh. In his novel The Point of Return, one of his characters points to the insularity of the 
Bengalis in the North East:
We [Bengalis] were not perfect, we are not perfect and never will be. We were insular and narrow 
minded, with a false sense of superiority when we ﬁ rst came to ‘Assam’. We saw the honesty of the tribal 
people as stupidity and through that we taught them our deviousness. That is the irony /…/ that we should 
have learnt to be more human only when they became less so. (Deb 2002:286)
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Space, maps and identity
The term ‘plural’ can be contested from diﬀ erent spatial domains. I would like to approach Assam in 
the sense of a heterotopia. An idea ﬁ rst put forward by Foucault, heterotopia means ‘many places’ and 
is deﬁ ned as a social space combining diﬀ erent functions: ‘a single real space’ in which incompatible 
spaces are juxtaposed in a sort of “counter-arrangement in which all other real arrangement (state/
territories/nations) that can be found in a society are at one and at the same time represented, 
challenged and overturned” (Foucault1997: 350-358). Ethnicity is a ﬂ exible cultural description loosely 
based on an attachment or a perceived sense of belongingness to any or all of the categories signiﬁ ed 
by ideas like homeland, cultural heritage, belief system and language. The multiethnic or polyethnic 
cannot be always understood in terms of the dominant and the peripheral, but also in the sense of 
a mosaic of contiguous groups. What we have in Assam are cultural micro-spaces, the markers of 
which are languages and dialects, dress, food and other cultural parameters. These micro spaces are 
juxtaposed within a larger cultural space of Assam and ostensibly a larger Assamese Culture with 
apparent overlapping contours of commonality. Calendar events like springtime and other agricultural 
festivals (Bihu, a harvest festival, is an important example from Assam, with almost all the ethnic 
groups having their own version of the Bihu) are the common nodes of culture that are most apparent 
and part of a cultural commerce in the transactive domain.
Yet resistant nodes of exclusivist idioms in the larger transactive domain, where the constituents 
of a heterotopic society engage and deal with each other, direct attention more to diﬀ erences based on 
unique cultural markers ranging across a multitude of references like social structures to performative 
forms, linguistic identity to local cuisines, than to sameness. Each cultural micro-space is consistent 
to its own linguistic and cultural core. And, importantly, such competing cultural micro-spaces, and 
their resistant idioms spawned against a larger integrative rhetoric like the greater Assamese nation, 
can collectively serve as counter spaces, a kind of resistant pluralism to an overarching rhetoric of 
larger unifying and homogenising discourses. We are not talking here of a pluralism in the sense of 
“discrete patches of culture, all, somehow, ‘equally valid’ within the polity /… /but  /…/ a collection of 
cultural entities that are /…/ not discrete and complete in themselves /…/ are active together and hence 
bound up with change” (Hewitt 2003: 190) and resistance.
It is also interesting to explore the notion of received identities as an agential factor in subsequent 
recasting and redeﬁ nition of the ethnic identities. Most of the smaller ethnic identities had received 
their initial ideas about themselves from both colonial anthropology and the post-colonial lineage 
that was more like continuity than a break. Culturally, the idea of the ‘self through other’ can become 
an enabling quality of self-assertion and it is through an internalisation of dominant categories 
that subsequent recasting occurs. Good illustrations of these are the mimetic social and cultural 
organisations that evolved in the model of those established by the apparently homogenising class. 
Thus, a literary organisation like the Asom Sahitya Sabha [Assam Literary Organisation] spawned numer-
ous mimetic organisations in the diﬀ erent ethnic groups, like the Bodo Sahitya Sabha [Bodo Literary 
Organisation] that took the forefront in stressing cultural and ethnic uniqueness.
The quest for cultural separateness and political self-determination is often sought in new car tog-
raphic exercises, in what can be seen as assigning people to a map. But this has its own pitfalls and 
it is time, perhaps, to take Korzybski’s postulation of the map being not territory seriously in Assam, 
if one has to liberate oneself from what Brian Harley had termed to be a “semio-logical trap and a 
frightening ideological weapon” that gives an “objective and natural appearance to what is mostly a 
cultural and social construction” (Harley and Woodwards 1992: 510). Beyond the innocuous façade of 
an objective and natural appearance of factual and topographical information and the belief in the map 
being a neutral representation, are the discursive formations through a rhetoric of power and neglect, 
marginalisation and usurpation. The map is being taken too seriously. The living world is too liminal, 
too ﬂ uid to be pinned down to a graphic representation, and that representation to be held sacrosanct. 
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Culture alters, people move and topography changes even as maps are being etched. There is almost a 
hermeneutical impossibility of representation and the map is more often than not a disjunctive device 
between life as a process and its representation in a ﬁ xed scape. Baudrillard mentioned this when he 
held that maps are no longer being taken as abstraction: the double or the mirror.  It is no longer a 
concept or referential, but “the generation by models of a real without origin or reality” (Baudrillard 
1994:01), a virtual world brought into being by a bricolage of coalescing fragments of culture, history, 
memory, and the positing of a perceived past glory over present depravation and neglect.
Palimpsest and Utopias
Maps in the North East are often seen as an ad hoc exercise that emerged through the interface of 
colonial and post-colonial mediation, and points no more than the areas location on India’s political 
map:
Northeast India has been known this way since a radical redrawing of the region’s political map in the 
1960s. It was a hurried exercise in political engineering: an attempt to manage the independentist rebellions 
among the Nagas and the Mizos and to nip in the bud as well as to pre-empt, radical political mobilization 
among other discontented ethnic groups. From today’s vantage point this project of political engineering 
must be pronounced a failure. (Baruah 2007: 4)
But maps in the North East are virtual worlds in quite another sense. There are too many maps 
being etched over a single space, with a palimpsestic vigour that ironically does not obliterate the 
older maps. Competing ethnicities want their own territories designated on maps; yet such ethnicities 
are not always contiguous groups, but fragmented and dispersed in a random manner within Assam 
and across it too. These are what have been termed as cultural micro-spaces. This competitive and 
continuous act of etching maps is creating a virtual maze that submits the populace to an inﬁ nite act 
of transgression, a continuous stepping into each others territory, the sense of being in an eternally 
split space of ours and theirs. People are being used as pawns to populate virtual territories, an 
orchestration by artists of discontent: the student leaders with their sophomoric sense of history 
and culture, politicians with their ad hoc economic and political agendas, the subversive rhetoric of 
neglect and persecution from both identiﬁ able and hidden authors of discontent. A band of virtual and 
amateur cartographers has drawn too many maps over a single space, and more aspire to continue 
the process. Such an enterprise in a heterotopic space is basically the selling of untenable utopias in 
the shape of a regression into past glory and greatness to an unsuspecting populace unable to come to 
terms with the loss of past languidity and the emergence of new livelihood challenges. But such maps 
are conﬂ ated with collective agendas of contributing constituencies of resistance and remapping. The 
map is a speciﬁ c abstraction of a space that does not convey all the forces that go into its discursive 
formation, and limit an individual’s comprehension of that space from one’s ideological or agendised 
lens. Too many people are confusing maps with territories. And when representations like maps, along 
with their accompanying ideological and political structure, fail to fulﬁ ll individuals’ expectations, the 
rhetoric of discontent continues into an inﬁ nite regress as a response to the ‘treachery of image’ of 
the map.
And such Utopian thinking comes in direct conﬂ ict with those that wield power, the actual powers-
that-be. The quest for an apparently non-existing perfect, cultural and political state is an indictment 
of the existing system, which in turn orchestrates and sets in motion a quest for counter Utopias, and 
behind the dreams of a perfect homeland is the reality of gore and blood, setting in motion a process 
of inﬁ nite regress, where maps are being continuously etched in a mode of mimetic severance; an 
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imitation of the process through which new territories are created. Thus, Meghalaya which was split 
from Assam as a tribal homeland faces the grim prospect of a split in very much the same way it was 
created; the Achiks (also known as the Garos) are demanding a new Achik territory to be carved out 
of Meghalaya in the same way Meghalaya was carved out of Assam, to liberate themselves from the 
hegemonistic machination of the Khasi–Pnar people. In Assam, the North Cachar Hill district, which 
was renamed as Dima Hasao in 2010, to cater to the wishes of the demands for a Dimasa homeland, 
now faces the prospect of further fracture, as a coalition of non-Dimasa ethnicities are demanding 
a new territory to be carved out from Dima Hasao for the non Dimasas. One draws one’s own map 
imitating the map from one which separation is attempted. That map was also perhaps drawn in an 
imitative mode focused on severance from another apparently oppressive cartographic entity. Such a 
condition has been described as the result of competing ethnic egocentricities where:
We have an incredible multiple of egocentricities arrayed against each other: the Assamese against the 
Bodos and the Misings and the Karbis; the Karbis against the Dimasas; the Nagas against the Meiteis; the 
Tangkhuls against the Aos and the Angamis; the Khasis against the Garos and so on. (Miri 2007: 5)
Ironically, the Greek etymology of the word Utopia can also be seen as a combination of topos 
(place) and u (non) which means a non-place, instead of eu (good) and topos (place), a good place. 
Perhaps a good place is a perennial non place. Maps are culturally generated representations, and can 
be seen to be an extension of how speciﬁ c ethnicities respond to the cultural and political ecology, 
that is how the speakers of a particular cultural group think and experience the world through a 
rhetoric of persecution and neglect.
Home and homelessness
Creating a homeland also entails the simultaneous creation of homelessness and acts of othering. In 
a non contiguous heterotopic ethno-linguistic mosaic that Assam and the North East are, the creation 
of ethnic homelands through acts of mapping, creates ethnic conclaves where the other-ethnic and 
the non-ethnic is rendered politically and culturally homeless in a space that they have perhaps been 
located in for ages. Simultaneously, those of the same ethnic stock for whom the homeland was 
created, but outside its mapped purview, degenerate into outsiders in the very land that their ancestors 
had tilled and lived in. Thus, the Bodos who are outside the purview of the recently created BTAD have 
become outsiders in their age-old homestead, while at the same time they are ineligible for all the 
beneﬁ ts enjoyed by the Bodos within BTAD. Moreover, the sanctity of such abstractions like map 
induced homelands is often attempted in the ground through acts like ethnic purging in an attempt 
to create insular homelands. Yet, simultaneously the creation of such insular homelands can double 
up as some sort of new age reservations, where the population is rendered into some sort of captive 
citizens, and where each act of stepping out can be seen as an act of transgression into another’s 
land. Maps and the creation of homelands in the North East can represent at any given moment 
of time, a combination of these: home and the loss of home, homecoming and exile, conﬁ nement 
and transgression, centrality and the marginal, opportunity and the loss of it, the friendly and the 
inimical, an insider and the outsider, and so on. The neat division into binaries is not possible in single 
dimensional terms. The map is no longer a representation of an idea of a place, but also of territory 
that is ours, that is not ours but could be/should/must be ours and also of what and who should 
be/should not be on the map. Maps have a wide range of referents signifying varying ideological 
strands and political strivings. The real problem is the attempt to enforce them in real lived spaces, to 
translate the graphic representation into the tangible. 
34 Parag Moni Sarma
Thus, as cultural subtexts like Bodo Nationalism emerged from larger nationalistic cultural texts 
like Assamese nationalism and imbibed a centripetal striving for a greater cultural text, it spawned 
newer cultural subtexts. Basically organised around the linguistic identity of the Bodo language, it is 
a heteroglottic space that has diverse strands interacting with each other. There is the question of 
the script: Roman, Assamese or Devnagiri? Then there are the followers of the Christian faith with 
its various denominations, the traditional Bathou7 practices, and the reformist Brahma8 movement. 
Thus, there cannot be a single source of cultural control within the Bodo nation, and the range of 
voices generates it own heteroglossia. The present centrifugal trends in Assam are the symptoms of a 
radical rearrangement and realigning. The proliferation of stock and clichéd rhetorical categories like 
linguistic oppression, unequal development, and marginalisation are entering into relationships with 
socio-historical and political speciﬁ cities of mutual transformation through ethno political encounters, 
and one witnesses a continuous process of new identities being created, and new demands being 
articulated. Perhaps, only after the process of fragmentation reaches an untenable and dead end, the 
reverse dynamics of consolidation and a truly federal set up will be set in motion.
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